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In a talk at a conference some fifteen years ago, I argued (among other 
things) that certain rather prominent attacks on Newton’s intellectual integrity 
were unjustified. My commentator treated the talk rather harshly, and at one 
point asked with a trace of scorn why I should be so concerned to defend 
someone like Newton: “Newton,” he said, looking right at me (this actually did 
happen!), “was not a nice guy.” I was taken aback at the time; but I now think that 
there is after all matter worth pondering in that challenge. I have never thought 
of Newton as a man who would have made a pleasant acquaintance; but I have 
come to realize that I do feel a kind of emotional tie to him, and for an interesting 
reason: namely, I feel genuine gratitude to Newton for what I have learned from 
him. In effect, he has been one of my teachers; and among the best of my teachers. 
I want to try, today, to indicate something of this. 
When I was a quite young student, with a strong interest in physics as well 
as philosophy, a question (not, to be sure, the only one!) that I found very puz-
zling was, How do “we” “know”1—or, more modestly, what genuine evidence do 
we have—that the law of gravitation is true: that every particle in the universe at-
tracts every other particle (and does so according to a known and simple quantita-
tive law)? Attempts to obtain anything like a satisfactory answer from my 
teachers proved fruitless. The question formulated itself in my mind more 
sharply: today one can, waving one’s hands, refer to the vast body of astronomi-
cal theory that is based on that law, and of evidence supporting that astronomy; 
                                                 
1 Quotes on both words, importing (a) a question as to how wide the community 
is that can lay valid claim to such “knowledge”; and, of course, (b) that the sense 
in which such a thing can be “known” is very much open to discussion. 
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but the law was—as one says—“discovered” by Newton: what evidence did he 
have? 
It occurred to me—in this I was aided by some fortunate circumstances of 
my educational environment—that one might learn something about the matter 
by actually reading Newton; and I was pretty well astonished by what I did learn 
in that way. The empirical evidence available to Newton all concerned what one 
can reasonably describe as, first, “ordinary” behavior of “ordinary” terrestrial 
bodies (which of course contains no sign whatever of any such universal mutual 
attraction), and second, crucially, the changes of position—against the uniformly 
rotating dome of the “fixed stars” as background—of eleven bright objects in the 
sky,2 and the changes in visible shape and/or luminousness (“phases” and/or 
“eclipses”) of a few of these.3 To say that these are, prima facie, scanty grounds for 
the astoundingly far-reaching conclusion Newton came to will surely be seen as 
no overstatement. The argument by which he arrived at that conclusion proved 
to be very carefully laid out, remarkably deep, and connected both with views 
about the way to conduct inquiry into nature, and views about the fundamental 
constitution of nature itself, that (as I think can be quite clearly shown) were 
highly original, but have gone largely unappreciated—this in spite of the domi-
nant position Newton has held in the mythology of science. 
The present is not an appropriate occasion to discuss in any detail the case 
of gravitation: to do anything like justice to that subject would involve more 
                                                 
2 The sun and moon; Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; and four satel-
lites of Jupiter. (In the second and third editions of the Principia five satellites of 
Saturn figure as well, bringing the total to sixteen objects.) 
3 Phases of the moon and of Venus; eclipses of the sun and moon, and of the satel-
lites of Jupiter and Saturn.—Perhaps, for completeness, there should also be 
noted the shadows cast on Jupiter and Saturn by their satellites (a kind of “partial 
eclipse” of those planets). 
  3 
technicalities than seem desirable here, and more time than is available. What I 
want to turn to is another surprise I had in reading Newton—one that relates 
closely to what I have just said about Newton’s philosophy of inquiry and his 
views about nature. This surprise was given me by Newton’s account of his early 
investigations of light—the subject of his first scientific publications, which long 
antedated his theory of gravitation. 
The very first of those publications was a communication to the Royal Soci-
ety, in February of (as it was then the style to say) 1671/72, describing Newton’s 
investigation of the “celebrated Phænomena of Colours”:4 his experiments, and the 
conclusions he drew from them, which in the version published in the Society’s 
Philosophical Transactions are called Newton’s “New Theory about Light and 
Colors.”5 What, initially, struck me as very odd was the fact that this “new the-
ory” was announced by Newton6 as “in my Judgment the oddest if not the most 
considerable detection wch hath hitherto been made in the operations of Na-
ture.” It seemed almost embarrassing to find such a claim coming from such a 
person as Newton about, apparently, nothing more than the discovery that sun-
light is analyzed, by refraction through a prism, into colored constituents. But—
and here I must admit that Hegel was not altogether wrong about everything—
there was an antithetical surprise waiting for me: this “new theory” of Newton, 
familiar to schoolchildren today (at least one hopes so!), and supported by him 
                                                 
4 Orthography of Newton’s letter of February 6 to Oldenburg, the Secretary of 
the Society (and publisher of its Philosophical Transactions); see The Correspondence 
of Isaac Newton, vol. I, ed. H. W. Turnbull (Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 
92-102. 
5 Orthography of the version printed by Oldenburg in the Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society; reprinted in Isaac Newton’s Papers and Letters on Natural 
Philosophy, ed. I Bernard Cohen (Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 47-59. 
6 In an earlier communication (January 18, 1671/2); Correspondence, I, pp. 82-3.  
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with very simple and decisive experiments, met with heated opposition from, 
and misunderstanding by, critics among whom were two of the ablest natural 
philosophers of the time. This thesis/antithesis pair was very instructive for me: 
reflection upon it, and study of the controversy, was of great help to me in 
shaping my understanding of Newton’s accomplishments. 
Again, however, this is not the place to go into the particulars of Newton’s 
optical experiments, his reasoning from those experiments, and the controversies 
concerning them. I have to confess a fear that without those particulars, the ac-
count I give will lack vividness and essential force; but I am going to try to repair 
that lack, at least partially, by an account of the contrast that I see between, on 
the one hand, the philosophical atmosphere that surrounded Newton, and, on 
the other, his own procedures, presuppositions, and, so to speak, meta-
presuppositions—his views about philosophical principles (in natural philosophy 
and in metaphysics or “first philosophy”). 
In Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding,7 an extremely pessimistic 
assessment is made of the possibility of a scientific physics; for brevity, I just 
quote two blunt entries in Locke’s own Index: (1) “NATURAL Philosophy not 
capable of Science,” and (2), under “SCIENCE,” “No S. of natural Bodies.” What 
                                                 
7 I have discussed Locke’s position in relation to Newton previously; see “On 
Locke, ‘the great Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton’,” in Phillip 
Bricker and R. I. G. Hughes, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian Science 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), pp. 17-47, and “On Philosophy and 
Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century,” in Peter A. French, Theodore E. 
Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest studies in Philosophy Volume 
XVIII: Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1993), 177-201; cf. especially pp. 30 (bottom)-33 of the former article, for evidence 
that, in response to Newton, Locke came to alter his position on the  possibilities 
for genuine knowledge in physics quite radically. 
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is the basis of this pessimism? I believe it is not too oversimplified to put the mat-
ter this way: Locke shared with Descartes a conception of what “genuine physi-
cal science” must be—namely, demonstrative knowledge from fundamental causes. 
But Locke did not believe, as Descartes did, that human beings possess purely ra-
tional grounds for knowledge of fundamental causes of the processes of nature; 
he thought, rather, that our knowledge of such processes is derived entirely from 
sensory experience. And he also thought that sensory experience simply cannot 
provide knowledge of fundamental causes. But this last proposition has to be 
clarified; as I have just put it, it is misleading. Locke did believe that—let me 
say—“something like” what Descartes held about fundamental causes in physics 
was true: namely, that these, so far as we have any acquaintance with them at all, 
must lie in what he called the “primary qualities” of bodies. So to the extent that 
primary qualities are qualities of sensation, we do know something about funda-
mental causes.8 And this residue of Cartesian doctrine Locke shared with the 
entire community of “new philosophers” (that is, natural philosophers who 
                                                 
8 One may ask how Locke thought we “know” this much about fundamental 
causes. Locke, in some of his more acute moments, asked this himself, and found 
no good answer; cf., e.g., Essay, Bk. II, ch. xxiii, §28: “[I]n the communication of 
Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the 
other, which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception, but of the 
passing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and 
unconceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Though” (contrast 
this with Bk. II, ch. v, §11: ”The next thing to be consider’d, is how Bodies pro-
duce Ideas in us, and that is manifestly by Impulse, the only way which we can 
conceive Bodies operate in).—In my opinion, one thing that makes Locke a 
singularly interesting philosopher is his willingness to confront, with honesty, 
some of the cruces of his own doctrine—even when the confrontation is 
inconclusive. 
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rejected traditional “scholastic” or “peripatetic” principles). It follows from this, 
Locke argues, that since we have no sensory access to the minute interior com-
plexion of the primary qualities of the parts of which bodies are composed, there 
is an insuperable bar to scientific knowledge of their properties and interactions. 
In the pessimism Locke expresses, he is perhaps unusual for his time; but 
his central position is not unusual. He quite allows, and encourages, a program 
of investigating nature experimentally, not only to gather information that may 
be of practical use (and he does say that practical use is what our minds are 
really adapted for: “The Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all 
our Purposes”),9 but also as a basis upon which we may form, with more or less 
probability, conjectures about the causes of natural processes.10 This is in essential 
agreement with the position stated by Christiaan Huygens11 (“the great Huy-
genius,” as Locke called him): one may reasonably say that there is merely a 
verbal difference between the two philosophers, Locke refusing the honorific 
term science to what is merely “probable,” whereas Huygens was quite happy to 
dignify with that title results that are systematic and probable—at least if they 
are highly probable. The crucial agreement is that the way to achieve the best un-
derstanding of a natural phenomenon that human beings are capable of is the 
seeking of what in a later time came to be called a “mechanical model,” and what 
Huygens—in his criticism of Newton’s first optical paper—called a “hypothesis 
by motion,” to explain the phenomenon. 
That conception of the situation of the natural philosopher actually had its 
roots in the writings of Descartes, although the latter had proclaimed early on 
(for instance, in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind) that all hypothesis or con-
jecture—whatever is at best probable—is to be rejected as entirely worthless. 
                                                 
9 Essay, Bk. I, ch. i, §5. 
10 Essay, Bk. IV, ch. xvi., §12. 
11 See his Treatise on Light, Preface, ¶3. 
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Whether Descartes eventually retreated to the view that science is after all to be 
pursued by hypothesis and content itself with probability is, in my own view, 
debatable (although I believe that most commentators now think such a retreat 
on his part is clear); but in his published works—notably in the Dioptrique, one of 
the three “Essays in this Method” published with the famous Discourse, and in 
the Principia Philosophiæ—Descartes clearly did avail himself of hypotheses and 
of appeals to the “probable”;12 so by his example, if not by his precept, and even 
if against his real intent, he did encourage such a conception of natural-
philosophic inquiry.13 
                                                 
12 (Indeed, of Descartes’s arguments not a few could be characterized as “prob-
able” only by the exercise of considerable charity.) 
13 Although it is apart from the subject of today’s symposium, and although there 
is certainly insufficient time to discuss the matter in today’s talk, I shall include 
here, at least as a footnote, a few words on my own reasons for doubting the cur-
rent view that Descartes had really abandoned his claims to certainty. As I have 
just said, one reason—and in itself one that might appear conclusive—for the 
view I do not accept is Descartes’s procedure in the Dioptrique, which is patently 
hypothetical, and which is even based on what is presented, not as a coherent 
mechanical model of optical processes, but as a fluctuating collection of mutually 
conflicting “analogies.” 
         There is a letter from Descartes to Mersenne, dated 5 October 1637, replying 
to objections that had been raised against the Dioptrique by a person Descartes re-
fers to as “one of your friends”—and who in fact was no less a figure than 
Fermat. The first of Fermat’s objections is to a principle, of a rather scholastic 
kind, that Descartes invokes in the course of his argument (one which, although 
it concerns the theory of motion, bears a somewhat striking resemblance to a 
principle that enters crucially into Descartes’s famous version of the ontological 
argument for the existence of God). Here is Descartes’s reply to Fermat’s objec-
  8 
That, moreover, this same conception was shared by a thoroughgoing 
Baconian experimentalist is clear from the following pronouncement of Robert 
Hooke’s, made in a draft that bears upon his optical controversy with Newton: “I 
judge there is noething conduces soe much to the advancement of Philosophy as 
the examining of hypotheses by experiments & the inquiry into Experiments by 
hypotheses. and I have the Authority of the Incomparable Verulam to warrant 
me.”14 
                                                                                                                                                 
tion: “I am convinced that he conceived this doubt because he imagined I was 
doubtful on the point myself and because I put these words on page 8: ‘It is very 
easy to believe that the tendency to move must follow … the same laws as does 
the movement itself.’ He thought that when I said that something was easy to 
believe, I meant that it was no more than probable; but in this he has altogether 
mistaken my meaning. I consider almost as false whatever is only a matter of 
probability; and when I say that something is easy to believe I do not mean that it 
is only probable, but that it is so clear and so evident that there is no need for me 
to stop to prove it.” (Quoted in the translation by Dugald Murdoch, in The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. III, The Correspondence, tr. John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny 
[Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 73-4.)—I have mentioned this letter to 
several Descartes scholars, who proved not to have previously noticed it. It offers 
a number of points for reflection, but I shall content myself here with calling at-
tention to Descartes’s continuing rejection of the merely probable. My own view 
is that he considered what he revealed in his publications to be only a partial 
sketch of results that in his own mind were, in their major parts, established with 
certainty on the basis of indubitable arguments from clear and distinct first prin-
ciples. 
14 From a MS judged to date c. June 1672, apparently intended for William, Lord 
Brouncker; see Correspondence of Isaac Newton, I, p. 202. 
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Newton, however, did not share this conception; on the contrary, he 
deprecated conjectures and probabilities in terms almost as strong as those of 
Descartes—and this not just after controversies had arisen, but in his optical 
lectures delivered as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in Cambridge Univer-
sity in 1670 (when Newton was twenty-seven).15 In the third of these lectures—it 
is astounding to picture the audience to which these words were spoken!— 
Newton digresses to excuse the introduction of such a subject as colors into the 
lectures of a professor of mathematics: “[S]ince an exact science of [colors],” he 
says, “seems to be one of the most difficult things that Philosophy is in need of, I 
hope to show—as it were, by my example—how valuable mathematics is in 
natural Philosophy. I therefore urge geometers to investigate Nature more 
rigorously, and those devoted to natural science to learn geometry first. Hence 
the former shall not entirely spend their time in speculations of no use to human 
life, nor shall the latter, while working assiduously with a preposterous method, 
perpetually fail to reach their goal. But truly with the help of philosophizing 
Geometers and Philosophers who practice Geometry, instead of the conjectures 
and probabilities that are being marketed everywhere, we shall finally achieve a 
natural science secured by the highest evidence.”16 
Do not misconstrue this as a proposal that natural science be sought and 
established more geometrico, and thus as a revival of something akin to Descartes’s 
original program. One does sometimes meet with claims of that kind,17 but they 
                                                 
15 (To be precise: Newton was born on Christmas day, 1642, and the first of these 
lectures was delivered in January, 1670.) 
16 The Optical Papers of Isaac Newton, vol. I, ed. Alan E. Shapiro (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1984), pp. 87, 89 (Latin original on pp. 86, 88); I have departed 
slightly from Shapiro’s translation. 
17 For example, John Heilbron, in his Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries: a 
Study of Early Modern Physics (University of California Press, 1979), p. 31, says of 
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are grossly mistaken; indeed, the investigation that Newton has described in the 
lectures preceding the passage I have quoted was an experimental investigation, 
not a geometrical one: that is the reason for his apology. It may be useful to con-
trast specifically the method laid out by Descartes for the study of questions 
about light and the method employed by Newton. 
Under “Rule Eight” of the Regulæ ad Directionem Ingenii, Descartes informs 
us that a certain problem in optics requires a knowledge of the law of refraction; 
that to learn what this law is, it will not do to ask an expert, and neither 
conjecture nor experiment would be of any use.18 Rather, before one can hope to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the physics developed in Descartes’s Principia Philosophiæ that “its form—ap-
plications of firmly grounded rules of motion—is precisely that of Newton’s.” It 
would be hard to overstate the inaccuracy of this: the “rules of motion” of 
Descartes’s Principia (Part II, §§36-53) are not “firmly grounded,” indeed they are 
neither correct nor even really coherent; nor is the physics of Descartes’s Principia 
arrived at by “applications” of these rules (indeed, Descartes himself says—letter 
to Chanut of 26 February 1649; Philosophical Writings, III, p. 369—“there is no 
reason to spend a lot of time examining the rules of motion in articles 46 and 
following of Part Two; they are not needed in order to understand the rest”); and 
as for Newton’s physics, that is grounded crucially in careful attention to phenom-
ena—attention of a kind that occurs rarely in Descartes’s writings, and not at all 
in his Principia Philosophiæ.—For a recent statement of the view that Newton’s 
method was essentially the same as Descartes’s, see Freeman J. Dyson, “A New 
Newton” (review of James Gleick, Isaac Newton), New York Review of Books, 50, 
#11 (July 3, 2003). 
18 That one should not conjecture or inquire of an expert (“propose to learn [this 
relation] from the philosophers”) is a consequence—in fact an instance—of Rule 
Three: “Concerning objects proposed for study, we ought to investigate what we 
can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, and not what other 
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find the law in question, it is necessary that one attain to a knowledge of the 
nature of light itself (“a knowledge of the nature of the action of light”). This 
Descartes believed himself to have accomplished—it is the subject of the first 
part of what narrowly missed being his first published work, Le Monde; and the 
hypothetical and “probable” arguments of the later Dioptrique—in which 
Descartes claims to establish the law of refraction—are quite obviously based on 
the theory of the nature of light of Le Monde, which Descartes does not state in the 
Dioptrique.19 
The investigation that Newton reports to the Royal Society in the letter I 
have mentioned starts from a series of experiments, and draws—directly, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
people have thought or what we ourselves conjecture.” That experiment is 
useless is a rather more startling claim, and Descartes’s explanation is cryptic: 
“the problem … is composite and relative; and it is possible to have experimental 
knowledge which is certain only of things which are entirely simple and ab-
solute, as I shall show in the appropriate place.” That demonstration—and, one 
might hope, some clarification of this requirement—was presumably to be given 
in the last third of the Regulæ, dealing with what Descartes calls “imperfectly 
understood problems”; and this was apparently never written. I believe one can 
at least roughly interpret Descartes to hold that experiment can never establish 
exact relations among continuous magnitudes, but can only decide among well-
understood discrete alternatives. 
19 He does state it in the Principia Philosophiæ, Part III, §§55ff., and says (in §64) 
that all the properties of light can be deduced from this theory.—To prevent 
misunderstanding: the arguments for the law of refraction in the Dioptrics are 
“obviously” based on this theory, in the sense that the analogies to which 
Descartes there appeals are clearly motivated by the theory; but those arguments 
do not  establish that the law follows from the theory—in point of fact, it doesn’t. 
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Newton emphasizes, from the results of these experiments—these inferences 
about light20: 
(1) Ordinary light—daylight, sunlight—does not accurately obey the re-
ceived law of refraction: that the ratio of the sine of the angle of 
refraction to that of the angle of incidence, for light passing from one 
to another particular medium, is fixed. 
(2) On the other hand, there is a kind of light different from ordinary 
light, and, of this kind, an “indefinite variety”—sensibly, a continu-
um— of particular sub-kinds, which can be obtained separately by 
suitable experimental procedures. These separate particular kinds 
Newton calls “homogeneal,”  “uniform,”  “similar,” or “uncom-
pounded.” 
(3) Ordinary—“white”—light can be produced by combining together 
(in suitable proportions) all the kinds of homogeneal lights; and the 
latter are obtainable from white light (indeed, that is the way Newton 
did obtain them). 
(4) The homogeneal lights have each an array of properties in which 
they differ from one another, and which (on the evidence of many 
experimental attempts to alter them) are immutable for each separate 
homogeneal kind. These properties include degree of refrangibility, 
and— here I use Newton’s very careful initial formulation—“their 
disposition to exhibit this or that particular colour.” 
(5) When homogeneal lights are combined, the result may be ordinary 
white light, or—if the combining proportions are different—it may 
be light that “exhibits” some other color; this is the usual case of the 
colors of the objects we see. All lights are characterizable as 
                                                 
20  I formulate them in terms a little different from Newton’s, but in substance I 
follow him closely. 
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homogeneal, or as “composed” of homogeneal lights in some 
definite proportions; and those homogeneal components remain 
immutable in the compound, in the sense that whatever homogeneal 
kinds went into that compound, all the same ones—and no others—
can be retrieved from it again, by (for instance) exploiting their 
different refrangibilities as a means for separating them. 
As I have said, the announcement of these results—the claim that light has 
an internal constitution characterized by the proportions, in it, of the distinct 
homogeneal kinds—gave rise to heated controversy, and one point about that 
controversy—to me, a striking and also a rather amusing one—may here serve as 
evidence of the contrast I am drawing between Newton’s philosophy of inquiry 
and the then received wisdom. Note first that the results I have just summarized 
deal exclusively with kinds of light, and properties of these; bodies and motions of 
bodies are not mentioned at all. In his detailed exposition, Newton speaks of 
Rays of light—e.g., he says that light consists of “Rays differently refrangible,” or, 
more generally (that is, not confining attention to refrangibility), of “difform 
Rays.” Towards the end of his paper, Newton does suggest that his discovery 
perhaps makes it indisputable that “Light is a Body.” Now, the first critique of 
Newton’s paper was that of Robert Hooke, who had the responsibility to check 
all experiments reported to the Royal Society and to make a critical report on 
them. Hooke emphatically confirms that the experiments go just as Newton said 
(“as having,” he says, “by many hundreds of tryalls found them soe”);21 but 
rejects Newton’s interpretation of those experiments, as founded upon the 
hypothesis that light is a body22 (Hooke thus assumes that when Newton speaks 
                                                 
21 See Correspondence of Isaac Newton, I, pp. 110-14; for the phrase quoted, p. 110. 
22 See ibid. pp. 113-14: “But grant his first proposition that light is a body [etc.], I 
doe suppose, there will be noe further difficulty to demonstrate all the rest of his 
curious Theory.” 
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of “Rays” of light, he means corpuscles). On the other hand, a still more eminent 
critic—Christiaan Huygens—who reacted at first quite favorably to Newton’s 
paper,23 later demurred to Newton’s principal conclusions in the following 
terms: “Neither do I see, why Mr. Newton doth not content himself with the two 
Colors, Yellow and Blew; for it will be much more easy to find an Hypothesis by 
Motion, that may explicate these two differences, than for so many diversities as 
there are of other24 Colors. And till he hath found this Hypothesis, he hath not 
taught us, what it is wherein consists the nature and difference of Colours, but 
only this accident (which certainly is very considerable) of their different 
Refrangibility.”25 
Since both Hooke and Huygens accept, and praise, Newton’s experimental 
results, one might conclude that the controversy is not very serious. That would 
be to miss an essential point. Hooke and Huygens are also united—although 
they differ in their reading of Newton’s theoretical intentions—in rejecting his 
conclusion that there is an “indefinite variety” of kinds of “simple,” uncom-
pounded, light; they in fact both continue to believe that light par excellence is 
ordinary white light, and that besides this there are only two variant simple 
modes, or colors, which suffice for the compounding of all others. Hooke, in 
other words, thinks that Newton’s theory of the constitution of light depends on a 
hypothesis—the corpuscular hypothesis—about the nature of light; and since the 
latter he thinks, and rightly thinks, has not been established, he rejects the 
former; whereas Huygens, recognizing that Newton has not really advanced a 
                                                 
23 See the quotation in a letter from Oldenburg to Newton of 2 July 1672, ibid., p. 
207. 
24 (Here correcting an obvious slip in the text published by Oldenburg, which 
reads ‘others’ at this point.) 
25 Oldenburg’s translation, published in the Phil. Trans.; quoted from Cohen (ed.), 
Papers and Letters of Isaac Newton, p. 136.  
  15 
theory of the nature of light, concludes from this fact that Newton cannot have 
established anything at all about light’s constitution.26 
Think, now, of Locke’s pessimism, and its basis: that there is an insuperable 
bar to scientific knowledge of the constitution of bodies, in the fact that we have 
no sensory access to the interior complexion of the primary properties of their 
parts. Plainly, we have no sensory access to any sort of interior complexion of a 
light-beam; and Newton’s theory of the constitution of such a beam makes no 
reference to Lockean primary properties of its parts. Yet, some eighteen years 
before Locke published that estimate of the prospects for a scientific natural 
philosophy, Newton claimed—and I will defend his claim against any challen-
ger—to have “detected,” through his experiments, an interior constitution of 
such a beam; and one that can be described with precision in terms themselves 
based upon observations of light, independently of any view about the fundamen-
tal constitution of nature in general or of light in particular. 
I should like to call attention to one further circumstance in Newton’s 
investigation. His conclusion that “homogeneal” light is the basic kind of light —
the “element,” one may say, out of which light is constituted—indeed, in effect, 
in this theory, what, together with its properties, plays the role that Locke 
thought would have to be played in any genuine science by the parts of bodies 
and their primary qualities—this conclusion rests upon the fact that, as Newton’s 
experiments show, the “homogeneal” kinds have fixed properties and obey 
simple and precise laws, while the behavior of the kinds he characterizes as 
                                                 
26 In 1690, when Huygens published his Treatise on Light, he wrote in the Preface 
that he has not exhausted the subject, as appears (among other things) “from 
matters which I have not touched at all, such as Luminous Bodies of several 
sorts, and all that concerns Colours; in which no one until now can boast of 
having succeeded.”—Christiaan Huygens, Treatise on Light, tr. Silvanus P. 
Thompson (reprinted: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. vii. 
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composite can be calculated from the independent behaviors of their “homoge-
neal” constituents. But what is, in particular, the law of refraction of any one 
“homogeneal” light? The first crucial observation that Newton makes in this 
account of his experimental investigation is that the received law of refraction 
cannot be accurately true of white light; yet it is only from the study of white light 
that that law was found. Is the received law true, then, accurately, of homoge-
neous light? The investigation certainly does not show this, and Newton does not 
assert it.27 But he does show convincingly that the homogeneous kinds obey some 
definite law of refraction. This experimental “existence theorem,” to borrow a 
suggestive term from mathematics, is established in the following way: behind 
the prism that, by itself, effects the dispersion of the beam of white light into a 
spectrum, Newton places a second prism, identical in construction, in a position 
the reverse of that of the first one. When the light traverses only the first prism, 
as we know, the spectrum is produced; but when it traverses both, neither colors 
nor a distortion of the expected image occurs. Newton’s conclusion is that 
                                                 
27 Even in the Opticks, first published in 1704, Newton gives no more than 
plausible reasons in favor of the assumption that the law of a constant ratio of the 
sines indeed holds for “homogeneal” light (see Bk. I, Part I, Proposition VI, with 
the discussion following the statement of that proposition).—The experimental 
argument Newton gives there for the correctness of the law of sines for 
“homogeneal” light is in fact seriously defective, as has been pointed out by 
Johannes Lohne—see Lohne, Johannes A., “Newton's 'Proof' of the Sine Law and 
his Mathematical Principles of Colors,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 1 
(1961), 299-405. (On the other hand, Lohne’s discussion is rather seriously 
flawed, and Newton’s error, although indeed serious, is not quite as flagrant as 
Lohne maintains [—but to show this would require a mathematically detailed 
discussion, of which I have written a draft but not a finished treatment].) 
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whatever happens in the first prism, exactly the reverse happens in the second; 
and therefore, that “what happens” in each of these cases is something 
determinate—regular—or in later jargon, “law-like.” This seems worth repeating 
(or rephrasing): we have an early instance of the sort of experiment that 
physicists later came to recognize as especially informative, an experiment that 
crucially produces a null result:28 the fact that the two prisms together make no 
change in the incident light establishes quite clearly that, as Newton expresses it, 
the effect of one of them alone cannot be due to any “contingent irregularity.” 
All this would perhaps be enough to justify Newton’s characterization of 
his discovery as unprecedentedly “odd” and “considerable.” But there is some-
thing more—something quite astonishing. One of the properties of the several 
kinds of “homogeneal” light that Newton had discovered was a length, different 
for the different kinds, constant and unchangeable for each kind in any given 
medium, but varying from medium to medium in inverse proportion to the 
index of refraction of the medium.29 The actual value determined by Newton for 
the characteristic length for “the Rays which paint the Colour in the Confine of 
yellow and orange” is “the 1/89,000th part of an Inch.”30 Now, the length that 
                                                 
28 A very famous example is the experiment of Michelson and Morley, in which 
the observation that no displacement of interference fringes occurs is the decisive 
circumstance. 
29 This result was announced by Newton in December, 1675—thus nearly four 
years after his first paper; see Cohen (ed.), Papers and Letters of Isaac Newton, pp. 
177-205, especially Observation 6, p. 205. However, it is clear from his letter to 
Oldenburg of 21 May 1672 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton, I, pp. 159-60) that the 
result had in fact been obtained by him before the first paper was written. 
30 The clearest formulation of the results about the characteristic length is to be 
found in the Opticks, Book II, Part III; the quantitative determination cited here is 
taken from that source—Proposition XVIII. 
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Newton measured is what we know as half the wave-length (in air) of the light in 
question. The value he obtained is equivalent to approximately 570 nanometers 
—5700 Ångström units—for the wave-length. That is a wave-length quite nicely 
in the yellow (although perhaps short of yellow-orange).31 
Let me review a few points that seem to me remarkable in this. First, in a 
fashion that was entirely outside what was thought possible at the time, Newton 
had indeed discovered very fundamental structural properties of light, indepen-
dently of any theory of what light itself, fundamentally, is. Second, he had dis-
covered a structural property of a kind that, without the process Newton called 
“deduction from phenomena,” it would have seemed what one now calls a 
“category mistake” to attribute at all to a kind of light; nor did he himself have a 
well-founded conception of what, in the light, was the “bearer” of a length (on 
this point Newton did offer an interpretation; but it eventually proved to be quite 
wrong; and yet his conclusion that there is such a length, and his actual determi-
nation of it, were entirely sound). And third—in dramatic refutation of what 
Locke said about the insurmountable barrier to what we can ever learn of the 
minute interior structure of things—Newton had determined the value of a 
length that is far below what human senses can directly perceive. He had in fact 
made the first determination in history of a submicroscopic quantity. (It was also 
the last such determination for a very long time; the last such reliable determi-
nation until near the end of the nineteenth century, or even perhaps the first 
decade of the twentieth.) 
I have the uncomfortable feeling, on the one hand, that I have said too 
little—for instance, I am strongly tempted to explain how Newton succeeded in 
determining that minute quantity, in order to avoid what may seem something 
                                                 
31 Consulting a table that happens to be at hand, I find there, for the D-lines of 
the spectrum of sodium—a characteristically yellow-orange light—approx-
imately 589 nanometers. 
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of a mystification, and in order also to give an example of his ingenuity in find-
ing, with very simple resources, to overcome formidable experimental difficul-
ties. On the other hand, an audience not primarily interested in the history of 
science may well consider that it has already been given more technical informa-
tion than belongs in a talk on Newton’s philosophy. But I hope that, before the 
end, it will have become clear that a real connection exists between what I have 
called Newton’s philosophy of inquiry and a most original approach he took to 
question of metaphysics—one that I think penetrating, and possibly instructive 
still for us today. Let me here make a somewhat abrupt transition to his meta-
physics.32 
                                                 
32 Much of what follows is based upon the now celebrated manuscript fragment 
known (from its opening phrase) as De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum (and, 
more familiarly, as “De grav.”). This was first published in A. Rupert Hall and 
Marie Boas Hall (eds.), Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge 
University Press, 1962), in the original Latin followed by a(n unfortunately very 
defective) English translation. Quotations below from this piece are my own 
revisions of the Halls’ translation; page references are double—to the Latin and 
the corresponding English passages in the Halls’ edition. (I have discussed this 
fragment, first with respect to a part of its discussion of space and time, in 
“Newtonian Space-Time,” The Texas Quarterly [Autumn, 1967], 185-6—reprinted, 
with the correction of a serious typographical error, in Robert Palter [ed.], The 
Annus Mirabilis of Sir Isaac Newton, 1666-1966 [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1970]—the relevant passage in the latter volume is on pp. 269-70. I have discus-
sed it further, with regard to its doctrine of body as well as extension, in the 
article “On the Notion of Field in Newton, Maxwell, and Beyond,” in Roger 
Stuewer [ed.], Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science [Minnesota Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science, vol. VIII; University of Minnesota Press, 1970]—see 
pp. 273-8; in the articles cited in n. 7 above; and in my chapter “Newton’s meta-
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 Its first chapter, as one might say, concerns space and time. Of these, 
Newton makes a statement that appears prima facie to support a once common 
view that his theory of the nature of space and time is grounded in his theology: 
he says of extension—later applying the statement to time as well as to space—
that “it subsists, not absolutely of itself, but as so to speak an emanative effect of 
God, and a certain affection of every being.”33 One knows, of course, of Newton’s 
relationship to Cambridge Platonism in the persons of Henry More and Ralph 
Cudworth, and it seems to me beyond doubt that there is here an echo of Neo-
platonist terminology; but there is not the slightest obscurity as to Newton’s 
meaning, in the light of an explication he offers a little farther on: 
 
Space [he says] is an affection of a being just as a being (Spatium  est 
entis quatenus ens affectio). No being exists or can exist that does not 
have relation in some way to space. God is everywhere, created minds 
are somewhere, and bodies in the spaces that they fill, and whatever is 
neither everywhere nor anywhere is not. And hence it follows that 
space is an emanative effect of the first-existing being; for if I posit any 
being whatever I posit space. And the same may be affirmed of 
Duration: namely both are affections or attributes of a being [entis 
affectiones sive attributas] in accordance with which the quantity of the 
existence of any individual is denominated, as to amplitude of 
presence and perseverance in its being. So the quantity of the existence 
of God, according to duration has been eternal, and according to the 
space in which he is present, infinite; and the quantity of the existence 
of a created thing, according to duration has been just so much as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
physics” in I. Bernard Cohen and George E. Smith [eds.], The Cambridge 
Companion to Newton [Cambridge University Press, 2002].) 
33 De grav., pp. 99/132; for the application to time (“duration”) as well as space, 
see pp. 103/136. 
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duration since its first existence, and according to the amplitude of its 
presence, as much as the space in which it is.34 
 
—One sees, then, that when Newton says that “B is an emanative effect of A,” 
what he means is that if one posits A, one posits B as well: the existence of B 
follows from that of A. One sees further that one aspect of the peculiar metaphys-
ical status of space and time is this: that appropriate relation to them is a condition 
of the existence of anything. And one also sees that—entirely in accordance with 
this conception— Newton’s assertion that space is “so to speak an emanative 
effect of God” is based upon the propositions (a) that if anything is posited as 
existing, space is as well; (b) that therefore space is an emanative effect of 
whatever my be the first-existing being; and (c) that God is the first-existing 
being. God enters, therefore, only in step (c) of this argument: an atheist could 
follow Newton in propositions (a) and (b), and have the same conception of 
space as Newton’s.35 
                                                 
34 De grav., pp. 103/136. 
35 “Well, yes,” a critic might object; “but could the atheist have the same grounds 
for this conception that Newton had?”—This is an interesting point: it raises the 
question, what were Newton’s grounds for believing propositions (a) and (b)? 
Since Newton no more tells us this than he tells us what he thinks the evidence is 
for the basic principles of geometry (except to say that those principles are 
“founded in mechanical practice”—see his preface to the Principia), a discussion 
of the subject can only be conjectural. I think a plausible case can be made that 
Newton considered these views of his to be the outcome of reflection on 
experience of the world—including, to be sure, reflection on what is found in 
those documents he deemed to contain records of Divine revelation (but actually 
without giving this last kind of reflection a decisive place in regard to the 
fundamental principles of his theory of nature). But that case would remain 
highly conjectural; and there is no room for it on the present occasion (aside from 
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I have referred to “the peculiar metaphysical status of space and time.” 
Another aspect of that peculiar status is that, according to Newton, extension is 
neither substance nor accident; nor is it “nothing at all” (i.e., non-being, as in the 
atomists’ doctrine); rather, “it has a certain mode of existence proper to itself, 
which suits neither substances nor accidents” (that is, as an affection of every 
being as such). But why—since Newton is emphatic that extension does not 
require anything else in particular to support its own existence—does he say that 
it is not a substance? His answer is that extension “does not stand under the kind 
of characteristic affections that denominate substance, namely actions, such as are 
thoughts in a mind and motions in a body.” And he adds that “although 
Philosophers do not define substance to be a being that can act upon something, 
nevertheless they all tacitly understand that of substances, as is plain for instance 
from this, that they would easily concede extension to be a substance like a body 
if only it could be moved and could exercise the actions of a body; and on the 
other hand, they would by no means concede a body to be a substance if it could 
neither be moved nor arouse any sensation or perception in any mind.” 
The next chapter, the crucial one, of this metaphysics concerns bodies. In the 
manuscript from which I have been quoting, Newton presents his views on the 
fundamental constitution of corporeal nature in the form of a creation story: how 
God might create a body. Not how he did, but how he may have created bodies. I 
                                                                                                                                                 
brief remarks to be made below). As to the possibility of an atheist holding 
Newton’s conception of extension, however: this is in fact explicitly affirmed by 
Newton himself; see De grav., pp. 109/142-3, where he contrasts, in this respect, 
extension—the “Idea” of which we have as “absolute [and] without any relation 
to God, so that we could postulate it as existing … while we feign that God does 
not exist”—with the “Idea” he has sketched of bodies, which he claims is 
essentially dependent on God. (On this last point, I venture to disagree; cf. n. 36 
below.) 
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emphasize this distinction, as one of the most characteristic features of the view: 
Newton thought the nature of space and time was entirely clear; not so the 
nature of body. I want to present the matter in Newton’s own theological terms, 
and in a parallel, non-theological, translation or gloss.36 Newton asks, “What 
could God have done to produce those natural phenomena that we perceive as 
involving what we call “bodies”? He does not mean to provide the description of 
a technological process—to answer the question, what (say) we might do if we 
wanted to design a body-factory. He isn’t proposing to give a description of the 
actual means of such creation; only an account—but a clear and adequate one—of 
the effect to be achieved. According to Locke, for instance, this effect must be the 
existence, where nothing was before, of a material substance in which certain 
primary qualities occur inseparably together; and he indicates, repeatedly, that 
what that really means—what a “substance,” functioning as the “support” of 
coexistent qualities, can itself be—is obscure.37 In Newton’s answer to his ques-
tion, this notion of “substance,” as substrate or “support”—which Newton 
equates with the scholastic conception of “prime matter”—does not appear at all; 
and he cites its elimination as one of the virtues of his account.38 
In brief, Newton’s answer is this: God may, first, in effect fence off a 
particular region of space from penetration by any bodies already in existence. 
                                                 
36 In this (cf. n. 35 above) I do something Newton would have objected to: he 
himself affirms, as part of the “usefulness” of the “Idea” of bodies he has 
described, that “we cannot postulate bodies of this kind without at the same time 
postulating that God exists, [etc.]” (De grav., pp.109/142).  
37 Thus—referring once again to Locke’s index—we find there, under 
“SUBSTANCE,” the entry: “S. no Idea of it.” 
38 De grav., pp. 106-7/140-41, ¶¶ (1)-(4); and cf. pp. 111/144-5, where he goes so 
far as to suggest that an analogous account of God himself may be possible 
“without any substantial subject” in which his attributes inhere. 
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This already would produce an important part of the appearances—the phænom-
ena—of body: test bodies (as a physicist of our own time would say), projected 
towards this region, would be “scattered” from it. Second, for these impenetrable 
regions to exhibited more fully the behavior of bodies, we have to suppose that 
God makes them mobile: more fully, what Newton posits is that each such—let us 
say—spatial distribution of impenetrability maintains through time an invariable 
size and shape, but is able to migrate from one part of space to another, and this 
in accordance with certain laws, likewise imposed by the divine will. These laws 
must, in particular, determine what happens if one such extended impenetra-
bility should encounter another, since it has been laid down that they cannot 
come to overlap; the laws, therefore—“laws of motion”—include, ipso facto, laws 
of interaction. 
To pause for a moment: it is surely clear how the reference to God’s creation 
could be “bracketed” in this account: To say that “this may be what God really 
did” in “making” bodies is just to say that this may be what bodies, funda-
mentally, are; and this is perfectly intelligible whether the bodies were “created” 
or were, simply, there. In other words—although this is very far from Newton’s 
own intention—we might substitute for his reference to God something more 
like Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, and for “what God may have created,” “what the 
fundamental constitution of nature may be.” 
But there are two extremely important additions to be made to this account. 
The first is made by Newton in the same fragment I have been quoting from. 
Once again, comparison both with Descartes—a comparison that is very strongly 
emphasized by Newton in this text—and with Locke can be highly instructive. 
What Newton is trying to do is to give an account of the “essential attributes” 
(Descartes), or the “primary qualities” (Locke), of bodies. He has already made a 
crucial addition to the Cartesian doctrine in stressing impenetrability itself 
(which Locke calls “solidity”) as something not contained in the “Idea” of 
extension but—according to the sketched theory—“essential” to bodies. If he had 
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stopped there, he would have provided an account exactly suited to the so-called 
mechanical—or “corpuscularian”—philosophy, recommended by Locke as  “that 
which is thought to go farthest in intelligible Explication of the Qualities of 
Bodies.”39 But Newton says that this is inadequate. To make clear why, just 
reflect upon the fact that the account of “creation” I have reported is described by 
Newton as the creation of a new body, which should be indistinguishable in 
nature from bodies already existent. This “new” body is detected by its ability to 
“scatter”—what? Answer: old bodies. So it is already assumed that we are 
somehow able to perceive these old bodies. If we are to have here an intelligible 
account of creation in principio,40 we cannot assume that there is any “funda-
mental” difference between the “new” and the “old” bodies. What Newton says 
is that if we are to imitate Descartes in asking what properties of bodies we can 
or cannot “strip away” from them without robbing them of their character as 
bodies, we have to recognize that among those properties is their ability to affect 
our perceptual apparatus—and also, their susceptibility to being moved by our 
minds (since we move our own bodies—and, in Newton’s view, any material 
particle could come to form a part of one’s body).41 So this first amendment to the 
                                                 
39 Essay, Bk. IV, ch. iii, §16.  
40 (This is intended as a pun—perhaps weak as a piece of wit, but important as a 
piece of philosophy: not only creation “in the beginning,” but, what matters 
more, creation in principle.) 
41 De grav., pp. 106/140; and—especially—the following (pp. 112/145-6): 
“Moreover, that I may respond more exactly to Descartes’s argument: let us take 
from body (as he bids) weight hardness and all sensible qualities, so that nothing 
at length remains but what pertains to the essence thereof. Will extension alone 
be left now?—by no means. For we may further remove that faculty or power by 
which they move the perceptions of thinking things. For since the distinction 
between the Ideas of thought and extension is so great that there does not appear 
  26 
corpuscularian doctrine makes the power to interact with minds as much a funda-
mental aspect of the nature of bodies as the power to interact with one another. 
This raises a question about the position of mind itself in Newton’s philosophy, 
and it will be worth returning briefly to the subject. But there remains what I 
have called the second amendment, which concerns corporeal interactions 
themselves, and which does not occur in the source I have so far been drawing 
upon—although it is entirely compatible with what Newton has said there. Let 
me re-emphasize two points: that in Newton’s view, a characteristic mark of any-
thing that merits to be called a substance is the power to act and be acted upon; and 
that such powers (including even impenetrability—the power of a body to 
exclude other bodies from sharing any part of the place it occupies) are not trans-
parent to our intellect or intuition. The amendment concerns a classification of 
the powers that bodies do have to interact with one another. Since these powers 
are encoded in the “laws of motion” with which the bodies are endowed by God 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be any connection or fundamental relation save what is caused by divine 
power: that faculty of bodies can be removed preserving extension, but it cannot 
be removed saving the corporeal nature. . . . But should anyone object that bodies 
not united to minds cannot directly arouse perceptions in minds, and that hence 
. . . this power is not essential to them: it is to be remarked that there is no 
question here of an actual union, but only of a faculty in bodies by which they 
are capable of a union through the forces of nature. From the fact that the parts of 
the brain, especially the finer ones to which the mind is united, are in a continual 
flux, new ones succeeding to those which fly away, it is manifest that that faculty 
is in all bodies. And to take away this, whether you consider divine action or 
corporeal nature, is no less [a violation of the nature with which God has en-
dowed bodies] than to take away that other faculty by which bodies are enabled 
to transfer mutual actions amongst one another—that is, to reduce body to 
empty space.” 
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(or by the fundamental constitution of nature), and since the laws are not speci-
fied in detail in the earlier account, Newton has left a space in that account into 
which this classification fits without difficulty. The amendment dates from the 
investigation that produced Newton’s Principia, and indeed—in my opinion—is 
essentially connected with that investigation in a double sense: the amendment 
reflects a fundamental discovery made during that investigation, and played a 
crucial role in guiding that discovery.42 
In the terminology of this expanded theory—now incorporated explicitly 
into Newton’s physics—each fundamental law governing the motions of bodies, 
and thereby constituting the natures of those bodies, is called a (particular) natu-
ral power, or force of nature; and of these, there are two main classes. The first 
appertains to all bodies, and is called their intrinsic force. Newton characterizes it 
also as a passive force, and calls it the “force of inactivity” or vis inertiæ. The law 
associated with it is the conjunction of the three “Laws of Motion” formulated in 
the introductory section of the Principia. The other major class of natural 
powers—or forces—or “Principles of Motion”—is called by Newton that of 
“active Principles.” The exercise of an active principle upon a body is what in the 
Principia Newton calls an “impressed force”; and it is a crucial point in this 
amended account that each such exercise is an action between two bodies, 
governed by the third Law of Motion: an impression, by each of two bodies upon 
the other, of equal and opposite “motive forces.” Thus the fundamental laws of 
                                                 
42 This sounds involved; and indeed it is involved! Elucidation certainly exceeds 
the limits of the present occasion; I have discussed the matter, from various 
angles, in several places: in the articles cited in n. 32 above, and also in “‘From 
the Phenomena of Motions to the Forces of Nature’: Hypothesis or Deduction?” 
PSA 1990, vol. 2, 209-222. 
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nature—“by which,” Newton says, “the Things themselves are form’d”43—are 
laws of interaction: and the exercise of an active principle by one body on another 
implies that each of these bodies is both an agent and a patient of the power 
involved.—The double connection with the investigation underlying the 
Principia, then, is this: without this new conception Newton could not have 
discovered the law of universal gravitation, as the regulator of all celestial (and 
some terrestrial) phenomena; but without his discovery of that law—and without 
the evidence that convinced him of that law—he would have had no basis for the 
new conception of a natural power in general. (Note that, although I have cer-
tainly not here shown how all this is so, we do in this make contact with the 
puzzle I spoke of in my opening paragraphs.) 
In regard to the interactions of bodies, Newton’s legacy was a beautifully 
articulated framework of concepts, and a program of investigation: to seek to 
discover the forces of nature, and to seek them in the form indicated by the 
framework of concepts. He is explicit that both the program and the framework 
are tentative. He tells us, in the unpublished work describing the deeper aspects 
of the metaphysics I have summarized, that the account he gives of the nature of 
body is only of what, on the basis of what was known at the time, that funda-
mental nature may be, not what it must be; he relates this uncertainty to his view 
that bodies, unlike space and time, were created by God—are, therefore, prod-
ucts of God’s will; and God might have chosen to produce all the effects known 
to us by ways other than the ones he (Newton) has thought of. And the same 
tentative note is struck in his later major published works, the Principia and the 
Opticks.44 But clearly the framework and program are presented not merely as an 
                                                 
43 Newton, Opticks (4th ed.; reprinted New York, Dover Publications, 1952), p. 
401. 
44 In the Preface to the first edition of the Principia, Newton says that he is “in-
duced by many reasons to suspect” that besides the characteristics of the “Sys-
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empty schema, to be filled in by posterity: Newton himself had given a mighty 
impetus to the program, and I have stressed my opinion that it was only in his 
successful attack upon the problem of the celestial motions that the framework of 
concepts and the program of investigation emerged in his own mind. 
The situation is quite different as regards that aspect of the nature of body, 
as characterized by Newton, that concerns the interactions of bodies and minds. 
Here, Newton leaves us with no more than the firm statement that without pow-
ers of such interaction, bodies would not—could not—be what we perceive them 
to be; and with the clear implication, as well, that without correlative powers of 
interaction with bodies, minds would not be what we perceive them to be; he says 
nothing of what the powers are, except for the general indication that they are 
powers of bodies to stimulate perceptions in minds, and of minds to induce 
motions in bodies. 
Now, a superficial reading of this might lead one to suppose that that is all 
Newton thought necessary to characterize the relations of bodies and minds—that 
it is, in the jargon of our own day, Newton’s proposed solution to the mind-body 
problem. To suppose Newton capable of such a superficial move would be vastly 
                                                                                                                                                 
tem of the World,” which are studied in Book III of that work, “the rest of the 
phænomena of Nature . . . may [likewise] all depend upon certain forces by 
which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutu-
ally impelled towards each other and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled 
and recede from one another”; and so holds out the hope that the search for such 
forces may lead to increased understanding. However, he does not say that at-
taining the aim he has described is the only hope for understanding nature; his 
concluding words on the matter are: “But I hope the principles here laid down 
will afford some light either to that, or some truer, method of Philosophy.” The 
comparable passage in the Opticks is on pp. 401-2 of the edition cited in n. 43 
above. 
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to underrate him as a philosopher. He does suggest that an analysis similar to that 
he has given of the nature of bodies might even allow us to conceive of the 
attributes of God, and their interconnections, without positing any unintelligible 
“substantial substrate” of those attributes: having singled out, as the one obscure 
point in his supposition that God has endowed spatial regions with particular 
properties properties, the fact that we don’t have any notion of how God does 
this; and having argued that that is not a valid objection “since the same thing 
occurs in respect to the way we move our limbs, and yet we do none the less 
believe ourselves able to move them”;45 Newton says: “In the same way, if we 
should have an Idea of that Attribute or power by which God, through the sole 
action of his will, can create beings: we should perhaps conceive that Attribute as 
it were subsisting of itself, without any substantial subject, and involving his 
other attributes.”46 He immediately adds, however: “But so long as we cannot 
                                                 
45 De grav., pp. 107/141. 
46 Cf. n. 38 above.—It is worth quoting more of the relevant text than I have yet 
done in my publications on the point; this, then, from De grav., pp. 109-111: 
 
[I]f we consider the vulgar Idea or rather non-Idea of body, namely 
that there is hidden in bodies some unintelligible reality that they call 
substance in which their qualities inhere: This (besides that it is not 
intelligible) is attended by the same inconveniences as the Cartesian 
view. . . . Nay indeed on a view all round there hardly appears any-
thing else productive of Atheists than this notion of bodies as if pos-
sessing complete absolute and independent reality in themselves, such 
as nearly all of us if I mistake not are accustomed from childhood to 
hold uncritically in thought, so that it is just verbally that we declare 
[that reality] to be created and dependent. . . . [T]he Idea [of created 
substance] no less involves the concept of God than the Idea of accid-
ent [involves] the concept of created substance. Therefore [created 
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form an Idea of this Attribute, nor even of our own power by which we move 
our bodies, it would be rash to say what is the substantial foundation of minds.” 
As Newton sees it, the hope for a genuine contribution to the “metaphysics of 
                                                                                                                                                 
substance] ought to include in itself no other reality than a derivative 
and incomplete one. Thus the prejudice just mentioned is to be laid 
aside, and substantial reality rather ascribed to Attributes of that kind, 
which are real and intelligible in themselves and do not require a 
subject in which they inhere . . . . And this we can manage without 
difficulty if (besides the Idea of body expounded above) we reflect that 
we can conceive of space existing without any subject, when we think 
of a vacuum. . . . In the same way, if we should have an Idea of that 
Attribute or power by which God, through the sole action of his will, 
can create beings: we should perhaps conceive that Attribute as it 
were subsisting of itself, without any substantial subject, and 
involving his other attributes. But so long as we cannot form an Idea 
of this Attribute, nor even of our own power by which we move our  
 
bodies, it would be rash to say what is the substantial foundation of 
minds. 
 
It is worth making two remarks about this—a small one and a large one: First, 
there seems to be, in the reference to the prejudices of childhood, an allusion to 
Descartes (see his Principia, Part I, §71). Second, Newton clearly argues for a 
radical and “substantial” difference in kind between God and created things; 
but—in accordance with his metaphysical position in general—he thinks this is 
to be understood as a difference, not of “substantial substrate,” but of “substantial 
attributes”: that is, attributes that concern the power to act. 
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mind” depends upon the hope for an improved understanding of the relations 
among corporeal and mental phenomena. And Newton knows that, for him, this 
is something beyond the horizon of actual knowledge. I think it typical of him, 
and I hold it out as both rare and exemplary, that he neither deludes himself into 
thinking he can solve the problem of “what constitutes the substantial founda-
tion of minds,” nor takes the defect of present knowledge as a reason to despair 
of eventual progress in this domain. 
As to the connection I have claimed to hold with Newton’s philosophy of 
inquiry, and in particular with the characteristics of his optical investigations, I 
hope what I have said is enough to make the fact of this connection, and its 
nature and interest, fairly discernible (adequately would be too much to hope). 
But let me try to make a few points explicit: 
(1) Since in Newton’s view understanding of the fundamental character of 
anything can only come from knowledge about that thing, gained from 
experience, he sought experimental knowledge of light, for example, 
that would provide, not in the first instance support for a prior theory of 
its nature, but some systematic basis for further investigation—and— 
possibly—an eventual more fundamental theory. 
(2) A corollary of this “open” stance towards theories—a corollary I have 
discussed elsewhere in some detail but have not had time to illustrate 
today—is that Newton, who leaned strongly towards the “corpuscular” 
theory of light, had at the same reflected deeply enough upon the 
principal alternative, the wave theory, to make extraordinarily valuable 
suggestions for such a theory—suggestions that were largely ignored at 
the time, but were taken up fruitfully more than a century later.47 
                                                 
47 I have discussed this in two related, still unpublished, papers: “On 
Metaphysics and Method in Newton,” and “Further Reflections on Newton’s 
Methods.” 
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(3) A second corollary is that among the things to hope for as results of an 
investigation is the discovery both of new questions that may be 
profitably pursued and new instrumentalities for conducting further 
investigations. Another reason, which I have not here touched on, for 
the importance Newton ascribed to his first optical discovery, is that he 
viewed the interactions with bodies of homogeneous light as a possible 
means for obtaining information about precisely that minute internal 
structure of bodies which Locke had thought forever inaccessible to us.48  
(4) More generally, where Locke sought for the most basic information we 
can have about natural things in their perceptible qualities, Newton 
looked to what Locke called “qualities mediately perceived”: i.e., to 
information about the interactions of things. This is certainly related to 
his view of substance as that which is capable of “action” (although its 
experimental application is not dependent upon this metaphysical 
view). 
(5) In Newton’s account of the nature of body, laws play a central role; and 
it is regularities—laws of behavior—that he primarily sought in his study 
of phenomena. It is these that make the results of the investigations 
what I have called “systematic.” And it is this goal that underlies 
Newton’s emphasis upon the role “geometers” have to play in the study 
of nature. He says of the optical principles he has discovered that they 
are “such that on them mathematicians may determin all the Phænom-
ena of colours that can be caused by refractions”: the emphasis is not 
                                                 
48 This is apparent (although it has not been widely noted) in Books II and III of 
the Opticks; I have discussed the matter in the papers referred to in the preceding 
note. 
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primarily on the quantitative nature of the results, but on the fact that 
they form a basis for mathematical reasoning.49   
(6) Not only deeper knowledge in physics, but deeper knowledge of what 
Newton calls “the substantial foundation” of things, can be consequent 
upon investigation of phenomena; I have claimed here—and elsewhere 
have argued—that the great investigation that gave us the Principia in-
volved a simultaneous and mutually interdependent development of new 
“metaphysical” principles and new physical principles. 
But in my discussion today of Newton’s philosophy of inquiry there is one 
unavoidable but regrettable gap: I have not attempted to show that, and how, 
Newton’s claims are indeed—genuinely—justified by the empirical evidence he 
cites for them. This is a subject that in my opinion richly repays investigation; 
and I should not like to close today without at least mentioning the very 
rewarding studies that have been made in recent years by William Harper and 
                                                 
49 Once, when in a talk I spoke of the importance of the notion of a law of nature in 
Newton’s philosophy, it was objected that we still have no clear conception of 
what constitutes a “law.” I answered that to tell this to Newton would be like 
telling a musician that we have no clear conception of what constitutes a tune. 
My answer may seem frivolous; but what I contend is that there is a clear enough 
conception of law for Newton—and, since Newton, others!—to have made very 
good use of, even if philosophers of science have been unsuccessful in their 
attempts at a general definition. Indeed, I contend (a) that this is a fact; (b) that it 
is not the only instance of a useful working conception that philosophers of 
science have so far failed to explicate; and (c) that that is a circumstance 
philosophers of science ought to be aware of. 
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by George Smith, dealing with Newton’s procedures in what he calls his 
“deductions from phenomena.”50 On this note, then, I do close. 
 
  
                                                 
50 See William Harper, “Newton’s Classic Deductions from Phenomena,” 
Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1990), 183-96; “Isaac Newton on Empirical 
Success and Scientific Method,” in The Cosmos of Science, ed. John Earman and 
John D.Norton (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), pp. 55-86; 
“Measurement and Approximation: Newton’s Inferences from Phenomena 
versus Glymour’s Bootstrap Confirmation,” in The Role of Pragmatics in 
Contemporary Philosophy, ed. P. Weingartner, G. Schurz, and G. Dorn (Vienna: 
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1998), pp. 65-87; “The First Six Propositions in 
Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation,” The St. John’s Review 45, no. 2 
(1999), 74-93; “Howard Stein on Isaac Newton: Beyond Hypotheses?” in Reading 
Natural Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court, 2002), pp. 71-112; “Newton’s argument 
for universal gravitation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Newton (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 174-201; and George E. Smith, “Fluid Resistance: 
Why Did Newton Change His Mind?” in Foundations of Newtonian Scholarship, ed. 
Richard Dalitz and Michael Nauenberg (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000), pp. 3-
34; “The Newtonian Style iin Book III of the Principia,” in Newton’s Natural 
Philosophy, ed. Jed Z. Buchwald and I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2001), pp. 249-313; “From the Phenomenon of the Ellipse to an Inverse-
Square Force: Why Not?” in Reading Natural Philosophy (cited above), pp. 31-70; 
and “The methodology of the Principia,” in The Cambridge Companion to Newton 
(cited above), pp. 138-173. (With no derogation to the merits of the other articles 
cited here, I should lke to call poarticular attention to the cited paper of George 
Smith in Reading Natural Phiilosophy as an especially illuminating study of 
Newton’s methodological procedure in a crucial point of his argument.) 
